The present situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
When Laurent Désiré Kabila, the predecessor
and father of the current president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
was killed on 16 January 2001, the Western press and political leaders were
openly supportive of this killing. “A window of opportunity is now opening”
said Louis Michel, the then minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium. In August
1998, Rwanda and Uganda had begun a war of aggression against Congo with the support of Europe and the US. Aldo Ajello, the special envoy of the European Union
for central Africa, declared at the end of his mandate in March 2007: “It is
true that Kabila was not popular, in fact, everybody (in the West and in
pro-Western Africa) would have preferred the blitzkrieg (of Rwanda and Uganda)
to have succeeded. But then Kabila preferred to give a military answer (to the
aggressors) instead of a political answer. But the Rwandans had the best army
in central Africa. They were advancing. Finally the hand of the holy ghost has
arrived and Laurent Kabila has been murdered and his son Joseph Kabila has
arrived.” (Le Soir, 4 March 2007)
In order to eliminate Laurent Kabila, the West
slaughtered 5 million Congolese who died in the war between 1998 and 2003.
Why unleash this cynical barbarity to
eliminate one man, the president of Congo?
It was because Laurent Kabila had committed
the crime of mobilising the Congolese people in an armed struggle against the
Mobutu regime. It was because Laurent Kabila spoke to the Congolese people as a
revolutionary who didn’t accept the old colonial and neo-colonial system. It
was because Laurent Kabila defended an economic policy that was focused on the
problems of Congolese people instead of the profits of Western multinationals:
the only economic reconstruction plan for Congo, written by Congolese ministers
without the ‘help’ of The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB)
advisers, was that presented in December 1997 in Brussels at the conference of Friends
of the Congo. It was immediately turned down. The final reason was that
Laurent Kabila was organising the common Congolese people in different ways:
the young people were organised in a ‘national service’ to help build
infrastructure and undertake agricultural projects, there were the cantines
populaires [people’s canteens] to meet problems of food insecurity in the
big cities; and finally he organised the CPP (comités du pouvoir populaire)
[Committees of Popular Power] to build a state in which the power would be in
the hands of the common people.
After the death of Laurent Kabila, the west
expected there to be riots in Kinshasa, and the neo-colonial armies were ready
to intervene. On 17 and 18 January, La Libre Belgique was already
publishing photographs of the weapons, jeeps and tanks of the Belgian
paracommandos flying to nearby Brazzaville, to be on standby for intervention,
just as they had in the ‘good old days’ in the 60’s. But the Congolese people
supported the political legacy of the person they still call ‘Mzee’ (the wise man).
Instead of riots, there was mass mourning by millions of people crying all
along the route traversed by the body of their Mzee on his way to his final
resting place.
The inner circle of Laurent Kabila’s friends,
Abdoulay Yerodia, his minster of Foreign Affairs, and General Lwetcha, the head
of the army (FARDC, Forces Armées de République
Democratique du Congo) and old comrade from the maquis (resistance)
of the 60s, 70s and 80s which fought against the neo-colonial dictatorship of
Mobutu, decided to stabilise the situation and to organise the transition of
power into the hands of Kabila’s son: Joseph Kabila.
On 26 January, at the young age of only 29,
Joseph Kabila took the oath of president of the DRC. At that time the country
was divided into at least 3 different parts: one was under the control of the
Congolese army, another under the Rwandese army and the third under the Ugandan
army. Nine days after his father died, Joseph Kabila adopted a policy that can
be summed up as “making concessions in order to preserve the essential”. He
defined what was essential in his first speech on 26th January as follows: “ending
the war, that has given rise to so many casualties, as soon as possible; to
force the armies of the aggressors to leave the country; to restore the unity
and the sovereignty of Congo; and to organise elections – thus laying the basis
for economic reconstruction.”
The political events since then have been very
unusual and paradoxical.
The concessions were enormous. The list is
very long, and only the most important will be mentioned. Immediately an IMF
staff member became minister of finance in the new government. From then until
now, the governmental budget is decided and controlled by the IMF. That means
that economic policy is subject to the dictates of the free market, with
repayment of the debt as a priority, and private investment being the motor for
rebuilding the economy.
Joseph Kabila agreed to negotiate with
Congolese collaborators with the aggressors: the so called “rebels” led by
Bemba, who were collaborating with the Ugandan army, and also the pro-Rwandan
faction named the Rassemblement pour la démocratie Congolaise or RCD.
He agreed to form a transitional government in
2003, in which the nationalists were in the minority and power at all levels of
the state was divided between the nationalists, on the one hand, and the
pro-Rwandan, pro-Ugandan and pro-western ‘political opposition’ on the other
hand. You can compare this to the French resistance after the second world war
being required by the Americans to form together with Nazi collaborators a
government of national unity. This would be unthinkable by European standards,
but as neo-colonialists say: “in Africa democracy is played with different
rules than in Europe”. The most revolutionary pro-Mzee militants were
carefully kept outside the state-apparatus and also excluded from participation
in the elections.
The 2006 election campaign was completely
dominated by the Mobutist old guard. It was Bemba’s party that had the
political initiative. They launched a malicious campaign by questioning Joseph
Kabila’s paternity and nationality. Was he really the son of Laurent Kabila?
Was he really a Congolese? They accused Joseph of selling the country to Rwanda. And so on. The camp that was waging the campaign on behalf of Joseph Kabila refused
to denounce the war-crimes committed by Bemba. It refused to answer the
accusations made. Asked the reason for this very defensive method of
campaigning, one member of Kabila’s media staff answered: “The president has
given his word to the international community not to polemicise on the war
issue.” It was most astonishing to see how the Kabila camp limited itself
to saying only: “Vote for Joseph Kabila, period”.
You can say that Joseph Kabila’s victory in the
elections with 58% of the votes was like a boxer winning a fight despite his
hands being tied behind his back.
The west stays suspicious
In spite of all the concessions Joseph made in
the process that began in 2001 up to now, the West remained very suspicious of
him. Again and again he had to prove that he would accept the rules imposed by
the US and Europe. Mainly it meant: accepting a weak position in a weak state
totally depending on the support of the US and Europe. It is remarkable that
Joseph Kabila succeeded in attaining the goals he had set out on 26 January
2001, and this without a major rupture in his relations with the west. For
example, there was heavy pressure to give guarantees before the elections that
the losers would be given important positions in the government and in the
state after the elections were over. “The argument was that if you did not
give these guarantees, the war could start all over again”. The real aim
was to ensure continued division at the helm of the state after the elections.
Joseph refused and, in spite of heavy pressure, the militia of Bemba,
vice-president in the transitional government was disarmed and Bemba himself
was accused of treason and is now in exile and politically dead.
The most important battle is now the battle to
control the eastern provinces of Kivu. Notwithstanding the signing of the peace
agreement, the formation of the government of national unity and all the other
concessions Joseph Kabila made, the troops of Rwandan president Kagame, one of
the most important pillars of pro-American forces in Africa, still control
large parts mostly of North Kivu. An army well equipped and supplied with smart
uniforms, with war-criminal Laurent Nkunda as ‘commander’, is still active as
an autonomous force. The argument put forward by Kigali and Nkunda to justify
the presence of this army is that the Congolese government and the FARDC, the
Congolese Army, still collaborate with the Interahamwe (the militia they
accuse of having committed the Rwandan genocide in 1994). Nkunda is described
in Kigali as a hero who is defending Congolese Tutsis under threat of genocide.
Kagame’s dictatorship is built on the demagogic claim that he is defending the
Tutsis inside and outside Rwanda. This is on a par with the Zionist ideology
that similarly justifies terror against Palestinians and aggression against Israel’s Arab neighbours. The real aim of Kagame is to maintain the ethnic tension in Kivu
and to continue the chaos as long as possible in order to weaken the position
of Joseph Kabila. Because of all the crimes that his army has committed since
1994, Kagame knows that he is hated by a large majority of people who live in Rwanda and in neighbouring Kivu. A stable Congo is, therefore, a deadly threat to Kagame.
The dream Kagame and his imperialist masters pursue is that of an independent
buffer state between Congo and Rwanda.
The position of the President and the
government in Kinshasa is that the defence of every community in Congo is the task of the Congolese state alone, and not of any neighbouring state or any
autonomous militia. Moreover, Kinshasa is accusing Kagame of continuing to
supply arms and soldiers to the Nkunda militia. The governor of North Kivu Province has demanded an enquiry into the source of the weaponry and the
uniforms of Nkunda’s soldiers.
The U-turn of the US
Kabila has shown so much patience and goodwill
in negotiating with Nkunda and Kigali that today it has become impossible for
the US and Europe to require continuous negotiations with Nkunda.
The point of no return for the Western
position was reached on 15 October, when Kabila was in Goma, the capital of North Kivu, to prepare a final assault on the Nkunda militia. At that moment the
ambassadors of the US, UK, France, Belgium and South Africa, led by William
Swing, the head of MONUC (UN ‘peace’ force in the DRC) and CIA-superman, flew
2000 km from Kinshasa to Goma to hold discussions with Kabila.
While insisting for years, months and until
the very last day, on the “absolute necessity of there being a political
solution to the problem and to avoid a new war at all costs”, they declared
after their discussion with Kabila: “We are here to show our support for the
government of Kabila and also to support the right of the Congolese state to
protect and provide security to all the citizens of this state. We again appeal
to all dissidents to lay down their weapons unconditionally and without delay”.
The U-turn in US policy, that was immediately
followed by the European Union, was confirmed officially on 26 October 2007,
when Kabila visited President Bush at the White House in Washington. Bush,
shaking hands with Kabila for the benefit of the press, said: “Mr.
President, you’ve said that you wanted there to be fair and free elections, and
you delivered. And I appreciate that and congratulate you on being a man of
your word. And we look forward to continuing to work with you, sir, to bring
peace and stability to the neighbourhood. So, welcome.”
Has the Western position
really changed?
For the moment the West was obliged to accept
Joseph Kabila as president of Congo in spite of the fact that he will not
accept the presence of any military counterweight inside the territory and
state of Congo. The results of the conflicts with Bemba and with Nkunda are
just the opposite of what the West would have liked to have seen.
First: the policy of making “concessions in
order to save the essential” has, for the moment at least, succeeded. It
was militarily and politically very risky for the West openly to insist on
advocating a weak Congolese state – with rebellion and war-crimes being
countered only with “dialogue” and “political solutions”. Since
the eighties none of the strategies formulated by the West in regard to the Congo have worked or given the desired results. To continue to support the war-and-chaos
strategy it followed since 1998 could turn the whole region, and maybe the
whole continent, definitely against the West. The worst nightmare for the West
is a recurrence of the massive mobilisation and explosion of anger of the
Congolese people as occurred in the beginning of the war of aggression in
August 2008 and as occurred during the occupation of Bukavu, in South Kivu, by the Rwandan army under leadership of Nkunda in May 2004. After two days of
massive manifestations in every Congolese city, the Rwandan troops got the
order to leave Bukavu and the city fell into the hands of the Congolese army
with no bullet shot. The reason: the panic in western diplomatic circles was
enormous, even the evacuation of the MONUC was considered.
Second: in September, the month before the
Western U-turn, a huge investment by China in the Congolese economy of $8.5
billion was announced. This announcement was followed a month later by a visit
from the vice-governor of the Chinese bank for development in Kinshasa. There
was a second agreement and this time the exact amount was not made public. But
amounts of $10 and $14 billion were estimated by different newspapers.
The day after the first agreement was
announced, the Financial Times of 19 September in an article entitled
‘Alarm over China’s Congo deal’, said: “Large western mining groups are keen
to gain access to these resources to replace their dwindling deposits but have
largely held back from investing in the country – put off by continuing unrest,
widespread corruption and the lack of infrastructure.
“Alex Gorbansky, managing director of
Frontier Strategy Group, a political risk consultancy, said China’s $5bn draft agreement with Kinshasa would put pressure on both the large mining companies
looking to get in and the small miners already there.
“‘It will give China a distinct advantage
in the Congolese copper belt,’ he pointed out.
“He said large western mining groups, such
as Anglo American and Rio Tinto, were spending increasing amounts of time and
money weighing opportunities in Congo. But China’s move might mean they had
left it too late to secure the best assets.”
So time has come for the Western companies to
invest or to take the risk that they will “come too late to secure the best
assets”.
The knife always behind
the back
Bush spoke kindly of Kabila. James Swan,
deputy assistant of State for African Affairs, also spoke kindly of Chinese
activities in Africa. On 9 February 2007, Swan spoke at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He told the audience: “China has important interests in Africa, which include access to resources and markets and the
pursuit of diplomatic allies. None of these is inherently threatening to US
interests. US policy is not to curtail China’s involvement in Africa, but to
seek cooperation where possible. For example by finding complementarities in
our aid programs.”
So it might appear that the penny has finally
dropped. War, military threats and so on have apparently been replaced by goodwill
and cooperation between the US, the African governments and China. And Africa is on its way to development. But never underestimate the cynical nature
of imperialism. While they are kissing their enemies, they hide the knife and
prepare for the next battle.
In fact the Western position on Nkunda was
very ambiguous: while saying Kabila has the right to crush the rebellion of
Nkunda, at the same time the West insists that there should be negotiation and
warned that the Congolese army was “not able” to do the job. And from
the first military operation, there was treason. After the occupation by the
Congolese army of the village of Mushake, a stronghold of Nkunda, the Indian
brigade of MONUC refused to intervene at a decisive moment when soldiers of
Nkunda launched a counterattack. There was also treason from inside the army
that is infiltrated by former officers of the RCD-rebellion, and the Congolese
army lost the village. Immediately there was shouting about a big defeat for
the army and the necessity to dismiss the nationalist minister of defence, Chikez Diemu and Dieudonné Kayembe, the nationalist officer who leads
the FARDC. And naturally: the necessity to negotiate once again.
And on the front of the
political battles, the next time bomb is already ticking for the Congolese State. The Belgian professors who wrote the present constitution, carefully
planted this bomb. They prescribed the reorganisation of the existing 11
provinces into 26 provinces. The second article of the constitution says that
the frontiers of those provinces will be defined by an organic law.
And in article 175, they wrote that 40% of
taxes will go to the provinces and there it will be held at “source”. Of
course this option was chosen “to protect national unity”. But in the
conditions of Congo it means guaranteeing division, internal struggle, and even
instigating secessions. Why? Because everyone who holds a position in the
State will fight to the death to control as large a part as possible of state
income for the simple reason that according to Mobutist ideology the Chief
treats State property as his own. This ideology Mobutu borrowed from the feudal
ideology with which Leopold II defended his management of his colonial property
and it is still how the overwhelming majority of the present-day Congolese
bourgeois – who are evolving from a traditional comprador-bourgeoisie into a
bourgeoisie with nationalistic ambitions – in fact think.
In fact article 175 has already caused major
problems, because some provinces have interpreted the 40% as a way of
distributing the taxes, while the richest provinces of course interpret it to
mean that each province has the right to withhold 40% of the taxes it generates
and give only the remaining to the central state. The governor of Katanga, Moïse Katumbi, a man who is advised by the Israeli Mossad and the American CIA,
has already led a “rebellion” against the central government over this
question. He had to retreat, but he will wait for his next moment.
By February 2010, this decentralisation must
be completed. And in 2008 there are also scheduled to be held local elections
for the cities and communes.
These will be huge battles designed to weaken
central government and, for the moment, the “friendly” Bush
administration is already preparing for this battle without losing one second. Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
declared before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs on 24 October 2007 that the first area to focus on in the conflict
in the east is: “Extending state authority by strengthening civilian
institutions through the decentralisation process and preparing for local
elections in 2008.”
Kabila’s position remains
weak
Joseph Kabila has succeeded, up to now, by making
many concessions and hoping that time and inter-imperialist contradictions,
combined with the alliance with China and the passive support of the Congolese
people will see his administration through.
In order to avoid
provoking the ire of the US and European Union, he has buried his father’s
policy of relying first and foremost on the support of Congolese people. He has
broken with the tradition of Mzee who spent much of his time speaking with the
people and the soldiers in the army to explain his policy and to mobilise them.
He has dissolved the Committees of Popular Power and has completely broken with
the concept his father was defending of people’s democracy and a Congolese
state that must be in the hands of the Congolese people.
Instead he has been relying on a class of
technocrats, many of whom were trained under Mobutu. The Parliamentary
elections returned people who had money and power, the majority of whom had
acquired them in the period before the fall of Mobutu.
There is a big question over whether this powerbase
will be able to hold out in the next battle for the building of a strong Congolese State that seeks real development in the interests of the Congolese people.
A return to the policy of Laurent
Kabila is what we would hope for. But while hoping for this, we must continue
here in Europe to denounce the neo-colonial ambitions and intrigues of our
governments.